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Abstract—In this paper, we study the robustness of graph
convolutional networks (GCNs). Despite the good performance
of GCNs on graph semi-supervised learning tasks, previous
works have shown that the original GCNs are very unstable
to adversarial perturbations. In particular, we can observe a
severe performance degradation by slightly changing the graph
adjacency matrix or the features of a few nodes, making it
unsuitable for security-critical applications. Inspired by the
previous works on adversarial defense for deep neural networks,
and especially adversarial training algorithm, we propose a
method called GraphDefense to defend against the adversarial
perturbations. In addition, for our defense method, we could
still maintain semi-supervised learning settings, without a large
label rate. We also show that adversarial training in features
is equivalent to adversarial training for edges with a small
perturbation. Our experiments show that the proposed defense
methods successfully increase the robustness of Graph Convolu-
tional Networks. Furthermore, we show that with careful design,
our proposed algorithm can scale to large graphs, such as Reddit
dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
The GCN model takes in both feature matrix X and the
adjacency matrix A, the original model consists of two fully
connected layers parameterized by W (1) and W (2), together
with a final softmax layer to do the per-node classification. In
specific, we can formulate the whole model as
Z = softmax
(
Aˆσ(AˆXW (1))W (2)
)
= softmax
(
f(X,A)
)
,
(1)
where A is the original adjacency matrix and Aˆ =
D˜−1/2A˜D˜−1/2, is the normalized adjacency matrix. A˜ =
A + I is the original graph plus “self-connection” and D˜ =
diag{A˜1} is the degree matrix of each node. Although it
looks tempting to try augmenting with more layers so that the
information can be diffused to further nodes in deeper layers,
experimental results in [10] shows that a two layer network
is the most effective setting. One limitation of the original
GCN is that it directly aggregates the feature vector of a
certain node with its neighboring nodes, also the optimization
algorithm requires to do full batch gradient descent, this is
very inefficient when the training dataset is very large.
To deal with this problem, neighbourhood sampling method
came out [7]. GraphSAGE samples a fixed size of neighbours
for each nodes, and aggregates sampled neighbourhood fea-
tures then concatenates with it own feature. After that, they use
mini-batch during training. In this way, the memory bottleneck
caused by randomness access is solved, thus working with
large scale datasets and fast training become possible. The
aggregation process for each node v would be written as
hkN(v) ← AGGREGATEk({hk−1u ,∀u ∈ N(v)}) (2)
Where N(v) is the sampled fixed number of neighbour of
node v, k is depth, and h is the features vector or aggregate
features vectors of nodes. AGGREGATE is an aggregate
function, we will use mean aggregator with GCN setting
during our experiments:
MEAN({hk−1v }
⋃
{hk−1u ,∀u ∈ N(v)}). (3)
Despite that GCN and its variants are suitable to deal
with graph data, recently people found that they are also
prone to adversarial perturbations. It is worth noting that
such perturbations are unlike random noises, instead, they are
usually created dedicatedly by maximizing the loss metric.
By convention, we call the people who create such adversarial
perturbations as “attacker” and the side who apply the model to
testset as “user”. For example, suppose the user is doing per-
node classification, then it would be reasonable for attacker
to maximize the negative cross-entropy loss over a testing
example. The overall idea of finding adversarial perturbation
can be described as a constraint optimization problem as
follows
δ = argmax
δ∈S
J
(
f(x+ δ), y
)
, (4)
where J(yˆ, y) is the loss function and f(x) is our model. S is
the constraint depending of the goals of attack, two common
choices are {δ|‖δ‖2 ≤ r} and {δ|‖δ‖∞ ≤ r}, both of them
aim at creating an invisible perturbation if r is small enough.
For deep neural networks on image recognition task, there
are several ways to solve Eq. (4) efficiently. The simplest
one is called fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [6], where
we do one step gradient descent starting from origin, that is,
δ = η · sign(∇δJ(f(x + δ), y)), here we need to choose a
step size η properly such that δ ∈ S. It is shown that although
simple, this method is quite effective for finding an adversarial
perturbation for images. Moreover, it is straightforward to
improve FGSM method by running it iteratively, and that is
essentially projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [15].
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As to adversarial defense methods, we can roughly divide
them into two groups: first method is to inject noises to each
layer during both training and testing time, and hope that
the additive noise can “cancel out” the adversarial pattern,
examples include random-self ensemble [14]; Second method
is to augment the training set with adversarial data, this is
also called adversarial training [15]. Generally, for adversarial
defense in image domain, adversarial training (the latter one) is
slightly better than noise injection (the former one). However,
in terms of adversarial training on graph data, there are several
challenges that impede us from directly applying it to graph
domain:
• Low label rates for semi-supervised learning setting.
• Due to the semi-supervised learning nature of GCN, if the
nodes been perturbed are in testing group, then adversar-
ial training may not work: this is because propagating
the gradients to the nodes been attacked may require to
go through several nodes, but in plain GCN model, each
node can only access its 2-hop neighbourhoods.
• Inductive learning is even more difficult, it remains un-
known whether adversarial training on certain graph can
successfully generalize to other graphs.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Attacks and Defense on CNNs
Adversarial examples of computer vision have been studied
extensively. [6] discovered that deep neural networks are vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks—a carefully designed small per-
turbation can easily fool a neural network. Several algorithms
have been proposed to generate adversarial examples for image
classification tasks, including FGSM [6], IFGSM [11], C&W
attack [1] and PGD attack [15]. In the black-box setting,
it has also been reported that an attack algorithm can have
high success rate using finite difference techniques [3], [4],
and several algorithms are recently proposed to reduce query
numbers [9], [18].
Adversarial training is a popular way for improving robust-
ness. It’s based on the idea of including adversarial examples
in the training phase to make neural networks robust against
those examples. For instance, [8], [12], [15] generate and
append adversarial examples found by attack algorithms to
training dataset. Other methods modifying structures of neu-
ral networks such as modifying ReLU activation layers and
adding noises into images to original training dataset [24],
modifying softmax layers and then use prediction probability
to train “student” networks [17]. Adding noises to images
and using random self-ensemble helps with defensing white
box attacks [14]. Dropping or adding edges to graphs could
be viewed as mapping adding noises methods for images to
graphs.
Most of the above-mentioned works are focusing on prob-
lems with continuous input space (such as images), directly
applying these methods to Graph Convolutional Networks can
only improves robustness marginally.
B. Nodes classifications tasks with GCNs
GCNs widely are used for node classification tasks, the
original one is introduced in [10], after that tons of works came
out. From the large scale training aspect, sampling from just a
few neighbourhoods is a standard way to scale the algorithm to
big datasets. Different sampling methods are introduced with
different papers, such as uniform sampling [7], importance
sampling [2], sampling from random walk through neighbours
[23].
Different structure of GCNs also have been explored, for
example more layers [13], change ReLU to Leaky ReLU
[19]. And variety of aggregate functions have also been apply
to GCNs, such as max pooling, LSTM, and other different
pooling methods [7] [22] [16]. Original GCN could be used
as a kind of mean aggregator inside of GraphSAGE.
C. Attacks and Defense on GCNs
The wide applicability of GCNs motivates recent studies
about their robustness. [5], [21], [25] recently proposed al-
gorithms to attack GCNs by changing existing nodes’ links
and features. [25] developed an FGSM-based method that
optimizes a surrogate model to choose the edges and features
that should be manipulated. [5] proposed several attacking
approaches including, gradient ascent, Genetic algorithm and
reinforcement learning; [5] also showed experiments of us-
ing drop edges and adversarial training for defensing, and
claimed that dropping edges is a cheap way for increasing
robustness. [21] learned graphs from a continuous function
for attacking, also claimed that deeper GCNs have better
robustness. Recently more defense methods come out, besides
adversarial training, [20] used graph encoder refining and
adversarial contrasting learning, this paper explores robustness
on both original GCN and GraphSAGE for small datasets,
large graphs’ robustness has not been discussed yet.
III. DEFENSE FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we propose a framework for adversarial
training for graphs to increase the robustness of GCNs. We
will first introduce the adversarial training framework for
GCN, and then discuss how to scale it up to large graphs
and the connection between feature perturbation and graph
perturbation in GCN adversarial training.
A. Framework
Unlike previous defense work for CNN, GCN has some
unique characteristics that will cause difficulties for improving
robustness of GCNs.
• Low labeling rate: For most cases, GCN is used
for classification nodes in graphs with semi-supervised
setting, with lower labelling rate than supervised learning.
It will lead to a problem if we directly apply adversarial
training on it. For example, when attacking a GCN,
the perturbations of edges and features will be limited
almost limited to training datasets and their neighbours.
Directed attacks are more powerful than indirected ones
[25]. Thus during adversarial training only a few nodes
get adversarial examples. For example a node in testing
dataset may at least be the 4-hop neighbour of the
training nodes. While GCNs are usually 2 layers or 3
layers, thus transfer adversarial training information will
be impossible for that nodes, so adversarial training fail
to work in this case.
• Less of transferability for adversarial training : Con-
sider depth K GCN, the adjacency matrix A is multiplied
K times, and each node could get information for k-hop
neighbour, but as the result of matrix multiplications, the
further nodes (more-hop nodes) have less influence. Thus
after adversarial training, if a testing nodes that are far
from all adversarial examples, it will be more vulnerable
than the nodes in the training test or close the them.
For most cases, GCN is used for classification nodes in
graphs with semi-supervised setting, with lower labelling rate
than supervised learning. It will lead to a problem if we
directly apply adversarial training on it. For example, when
attacking a GCN, the perturbations of edges and features
will be limited almost limited to training datasets and their
neighbours. Directed attacks are more powerful than indirected
ones [25]. Thus during adversarial training only a few nodes
get adversarial examples. For example a node in testing dataset
may at least be the 4-hop neighbour of the training nodes.
While GCNs are usually 2 layers or 3 layers, thus transfer
adversarial training information will be impossible for that
nodes, so adversarial training fail to work in this case.
Proposed algorithm. It has been reported in [5] that directly
applying existing methods can only marginally improve the
robustness of GCN. Due to lack of connectivity between
training set and tested nodes that are being attacked, i.e.
(they are in different connected components or they are not
directly connected), the loss gradient of training set hard to
be transmit to targets nodes. That is because when multiply
adjacency matrix in GCNs, the further nodes will have small
values and closer ones will have larger values (It is similar to
Katz Similarity.), Thus targets nodes that is not in the same
connected components will not get benefit from the adversarial
training. And these far away from the adversarial training
set only benefit marginally from the adversarial training.
(definition for distance is the shortest pass from the targets
node to any node in the adversarial training set.)
With small labeling weight for semi-supervised learning,
lack of connectivity is very common. [13] shows that using
part of predicted labels as training labels could increase the
accuracy for prediction when label rate is low. This gives us
intuition to relief the less of transferability problem during
adversarial training.
Thus, we introduce the proposed adversarial training objec-
tive function as:
min
W (1),W (2)
{ max
||A′−A||<
J(A′σ(A′XW (1))W (2), y)}, (5)
where A′ is the modified adjacency matrix. For efficiency,
we do not constraint elements of A′ to be discrete. The loss
Algorithm 1 Framework for adversarial training
Input: Graph adjacency matrix A and features X , and
classifier f and adversarial generating function adv, and
loss function J
Output: Robust classifier f ′.
Predict nodes labels using GCN : yˆ ← f(A,X)
for : t = 0 to T-1 do
Randomly sample w group of nodes noted as Nodesadv
and Nodesclean;
get adversarial examples of the group of a nodes, A′ ←
adv(A,X, f,Nodesadv)
retrain f with loss function J =
∑
i∈L loss(yi, zi) +
α
∑
j∈Nodesadv
⋃
Nodesclean
loss(yˆi, zi); Note the retrained
f as f ′
retrain f ′
Algorithm 2 adversarial training using discrete adjacency
matrix
Input: Adjacency matrix A; feature matrix X; A classifier
f with loss function loss = crossEntropy; targeted nodes
Nodesadv
Output: adversarial example A′
Let e∗add = (u∗, v∗) ←
argmax∇A
∑
i∈Nodesadv loss(yˆi, zi)
Let e∗drop = (u∗, v∗) ←
argmin∇A
∑
i∈Nodesadv loss(yˆi, zi)
if |∇A[
∑
i∈Nodesadv loss(yˆi, zi)]e∗add | >|∇A[
∑
i∈Nodesadv loss(yˆi, zi)]e∗drop | :
A′ ← A+ e∗add
else:
A′ ← A− e∗drop
retrain: A′
function J is defined as
J(A′, X) =
∑
i∈L
loss(yi, zi) + α
∑
j∈U
loss(yˆi, zi)
loss(yi, zi) =
(
max
(
[f(X,A′)]i,:
)
− [f(X,A′)]i,yi
)
,
where L is labeled nodes set and U is unlabeled nodes set. The
loss of labeled data and unlabeled data are combined with a
weight α. Using fitted label for unlabeled data will resolve the
connectivity problem. We use this method to give each nodes
a label(the label maybe correct or incorrect), thus during the
adversarial training, each node are able to be in the training
set.
There are different ways of getting adversarial examples: (1)
adversarial perturbation that constrained in the discrete space.
(2) the proposed GraphDefense perturbation in the continuous
space.
Adversarial training and adversarial attacking are different
situations for GCNs. During adversarial attacking the values of
adjacency matrix and features are constraint on some certain
space. For example if the adjacency matrix is normalized
by row, them the sum of each after adversarial attacks on
Algorithm 3 our algorithm: GraphDefense
Input: Adjacency matrix A; feature matrix X; A classifier
f with loss function loss; targeted nodes Nodesadv .
Output: adversarial example A′
Compute A′ = argmax
∑
i∈Nodesadv loss(yˆi, zi)
A′ ← βA′ + (1− β)A′T
retrain: A′
adjacency matrix should always be 1; if the adjacency matrix
is discrete, adversarial attacks are not able to add a continuous
weight edge (say 1.23) into the graph. While for adversarial
training, when generating adversarial example, there is not
such a constraint, the values could be either discrete or
continuous or even negative, which gives us a larger research
space for adversarial examples.
To solve the inner max problem in (5), we use gradient
descent on the adjacency matrix. The time complexity over-
head compared to the original backpropagation is O(|V |2) per
update, where |V | is the number of nodes.
B. Scaling to Large Datasets
To scale up our attack and defense, we conduct experiments
using GraphSage with GCN aggregator. The difficulties are:
• For large GCN training with SGD, all the efficient meth-
ods rely on sampled neighborhood expansion. Examples
include GraphSage [7], FastGCN [2] and many others.
Unfortunately, currently there is no attack developed
for the sampled neighborhood expansion process and it
will introduce difficulty in backpropagation in adversarial
training.
• Due to the large number of edges, the existing greedy
methods are very time consuming. For example [5] [26]
needs to check the gradient values for all the edges at
each iteration, which requires O(|V |2) time.
• Due to the large number of nodes, adversarial edge
changing examples in the adversarial training process,
may not appear in the testing process. Thus the robustness
will be affected.
In our implementation we consider the neighborhood ex-
pansion used in GraphSAGE with the GCN aggregator. The
aggregator could be written as:
agg := A1σ(A2XW1)W2, (6)
where σ is activation function; A1 is sparse matrix containing
neighborhood list : B1 in Figure [7], A2 is a sparse matrix
containing neighbor’s neighborhood list B2; other matrices are
dense; we note predicted labels yˆ = softmax(agg).
For large dataset adversarial training, we could still use
the framework above, by only changing GCN function f
to GraphSAGE aggregator agg and using mini-batch during
training. The time complexity for each epoch is O(B∗B∗N1),
where N1 is number of sampled 1-hop neighbours.
C. Adversarial training in features
For large scale graph convolutional networks, neighborhood
sampling is a common way to scale up to large graphs. The
basic idea to aggregate features of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbour
then doing nodes classification. This gives us an intuition for
doing adversarial training faster and for large-scale graphs.
We could generate adversarial features and using these fea-
tures for adversarial training. We could prove that any small
perturbation in discrete edge space are all included in features
perturbations in continuous space. The time complexity for
retraining features is in each batch O(|B ∗ Nfeatures|). Ad-
versarial training on features will speedup adversarial process
especially for large batch training, furthermore GCNs will
also be more robust on edge perturbations. When considering
modifying feature matrix X with δ perturbation, the formula
of GCN in Eq 1 will be:
Z = softmax
(
Aˆσ(Aˆ(X + δ)W (1))W (2)
)
= softmax
(
Aˆσ(AˆXW (1) + AˆδW (1))W (2)
) (7)
For  perturbation on graph A, the formula of GCN in Eq
1 will be:
Z = softmax
(
(ˆA+ )σ((ˆA+ )XW (1))W (2)
)
(8)
Consider surrogate models without activation functions,
δ = Aˆ−1[Aˆ−1(Aˆ+ )(Aˆ+ )X − AˆX] (9)
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We use Cora, Citeseer, and Reddit attribute graphs as
benchmarks. For Cora and Citeseer, we split the data into
15% for training, 35% for validation, and 50% for testing;
For Reddit dataset, we use the same setting as GraphSAGE
paper, which is 65 % for training 11 % for validation and 24
% for testing. Dataset descriptions could be find in Table I
We conduct experiments on both single node and a group of
TABLE I: Description for Cora Citeseer and Reddits
Datasets Nodes Edges Features Classes Features Type
Cora 2,708 5,429 7 1,433 discrete
Citeseer 3,312 4,732 6 3,703 discrete
Reddits 232,965 11,606,919 41 602 continuous
nodes.
A. Defense for GCN
We conduct experiments to test the robustness of GCNs with
different retrain GCN : drop edges, naive adversarial training
in Algorithm 2 and our method GraphDefense in Algorithm
3 with our framework in Algorithm 1. Drop edges training is
a cheap way to increase the robustness of GCN; Retraining
with adversarial samples also works for defense attacks [5].
Our GraphDefense method gets the best results among these
methods when defending adversarial defense in most cases.
Table II shows defense a 100 nodes group defense using
different methods, for Cora dataset, the number of changed
edges is 100 for each group of 100 nodes; for Citeseer dataset,
due to the graph density is lower than Cora dataset, we chose
TABLE II: Result of average accuracy with different defense
methods on GCN for attacking a group of 100 nodes
Dataset Cora Citeseer
before attack after attack before attack after attack
Clean 0.8449 0.408 0.7434 0.396
drop edges 0.8338 0.474 0.7409 0.410
discrete adversarial training A 0.8301 0.492 0.7385 0.404
Our method 0.8486 0.692 0.7409 0.628
TABLE III: Result of average accuracy with different defense
methods on GCN for attacking singe nodes
Dataset Cora Citeseer
before attack after attack before attack after attack
Clean 0.8449 0.370 0.7434 0.440
drop edges 0.8338 0.374 0.7409 0.452
discrete adversarial training A 0.8301 0.554 0.7385 0.552
Our method 0.8486 0.540 0.7409 0.632
Fig. 1: Accuracy of GCN under different defense methods for
Cora, with modifying 0 to 100 edges.
to modify 70 edges for each group of 100 nodes. Our method
successfully beats naive adversarial training and dropping
edges, and increases the accuracy of GCNs for more than
60 % without changing the semi-supervised learning setting.
When attacking singe nodes, for each targeted node, we
modify 1 edge in the graph. Table III shows the result for
single node attacks by only dropping edges, adding edges or
both. We notice that in both Table II and Table III dropping
edges method is the least robustness expect for original GCN.
That is because adding edges are more efficient when attacking
GCN, thus although dropping edges is a very fast way, the
improvement of robustness is not significant compared with
other methods. We also notice that for the Cora dataset, during
single node attacks, discrete adversarial training is better
than GraphDefense, the reason might be discrete adversarial
training is more suitable for single node attacks. We will
discuss this in the latter part.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows more details of attacking
with different amount of modified edges. With the number of
modified edges increases, Our GraphDefense method remains
more stable than discrete adversarial samples retrain and
dropping edges. To investigate deeper in the reason why these
methods perform differently, we use to study the different
degrees of nodes accuracy corresponding to attacks.
Figure 3 shows the correctly predicted nodes and incor-
Fig. 2: Accuracy of GCN under different defense methods for
Citeseer, with modifying 0 to 70 edges.
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Fig. 3: Classification performance, after attack for Original
GCN, with different degrees of nodes
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Fig. 4: Classification performance, after attack for our
GraphDefense method, with different degrees of nodes
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Fig. 5: accuracy increase for nodes’ degree, compare with our
defense method for Cora dataset; X axis: different degree of
nodes; Y axis: accuracy improvement times
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Fig. 6: accuracy increase for nodes’ degree, compare with our
defense method for Citeseer dataset; X axis: different degree
of nodes; Y axis: accuracy improvement times
rectly predicted nodes with the original GCN. It indicates
that the lower degree nodes are more vulnerable. Figure
4 show accuracy ratio after attack with our GraphDefense
method. The accuracy increases a lot for lower degree nodes.
With degree follows power law distribution for most graph
increasing lower degree nodes robustness is crucial for keep
robustness of the GCNs. For Cora and Citeseer datasets, our
graphDefense method works well for improving lower degree
nodes robustness. Figure 5 and Figure 6 shows the accuracy
improvement when compared with original GCNs. In the most
case, our method gives a lower degree of nodes a boost on
robustness after attacks.
Next, we are discussing how accuracy increasing for differ-
ent methods. We use the Citeseer dataset as an example. Figure
7a 7b 7c show accuracy improvement for single node attacks,
and Figure 7d 7e 7f is for attacking groups of 100 nodes. Our
method not only keeps the higher degree nodes accuracy but
also boost the lower degree ones. When comparing attacking
groups of nodes and attacking single node, we find there
TABLE IV: Result of average accuracy with different defense
methods on GraphSAGE
before attack 50 edges 100 edges 150 edges 200 edges 300 edges
Clean 0.9422 0.8 0.6953 0.5688 0.4781 0.3531
Feature retrain X 0.8641 0.8406 0.8281 0.7859 0.7422 0.6797
Our method on A 0.9188 0.8391 0.8016 0.7828 0.7625 0.6969
our GraphDefense method results stay inconstant for different
kinds of attacks, and the accuracy for degree 2 nodes improved
by 6X for attacking groups nodes compared with 3X for
attacking single node. While for the other 2 methods, the
accuracy drops in some larger degree nodes for attacking
groups of 100 nodes.
More Bar plots are listed in Figure 9, which shows each
case how the accuracy changes before and after attacks.
B. Large scale and feature adversarial training
For large scale data, we use GraphSAGE compare with our
GraphDefense method, discrete edges adversarial training, and
adversarial training on features. We did not do a comparison
with discrete adversarial training and dropping edges because
previous experiments show they are far away behind our
method. GraphSAGE is more difficult to attack, because there
is a neighbourhood sampling function in these algorithms,
directly adding or deleting edges on the original graphs
method becomes less effective than on GCN. The reason is
when training GraphSAGE (or other large scale graph neural
networks), sampling neighbourhood could be view as dropping
edges during training, [5] shows that use dropping edges while
training is a cheap method to increase the robustness of GCN.
As a result, attacking GraphSAGE (or other large scale graph
neural networks) is more difficult than attacking GCN. Also
since attacking a single node by modifying only one edge is
not a significant attack, in this part, we show attacking groups
of 128 nodes instead.
Because the Reddit dataset is an inductive dataset, using our
framework Algorithm 1 is important, otherwise, the adversarial
training on the training dataset is very hard to transmit to the
testing part through the edges, as the result, testing data will
remain vulnerable. Figure 8 and Table IV show attacking after
different adversarial training methods. The result matches our
claim in Section III-C. Adversarial training in features has
a similar result as in edges when facing attacks on edges,
also adversarial training in features is faster than adversarial
training in edges. The performance of adversarial training in
features might be related to the data type. For example, Reddit
dataset features are continuous while Cora and Citeseer are
discrete. Although the result for adversarial training in feature
for Cora is not as good as our GraphDefense method, it is
still quite better than others, Cora dataset could remain 51 %
accuracy.
C. Parameter Sensitivity
In this section, we will discuss the weight between adver-
sarial examples and clean data during the adversarial training
process in Algorithm 1. Table V shows that choosing an
appropriate ratio between adversarial examples and clean
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(f) increasing accuracy rate for attacking
100 nodes by each degree for our method
Fig. 7: Accuracy improvement for different attacks using discrete adversarial training, drop edges training and our GraphDefense
method.
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Fig. 8: GraphSAGE accuracy after attacks for adversarial
training on features (Feature retrain) and on edges (our
GraphDefense) methods
TABLE V: Different number of Adversarial examples and
clean examples during retrain process in Algorithm 1, Cora
dataset.
Adversarial
Clean 100 200 300 400
100 0.634 0.692 0.616 0.622
200 0.522 0.54 0.555 0.55
examples during the adversarial training process is important.
Too large portions of adversarial examples will cause lower
accuracy, thus lead to bad performance after attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new defense algorithm call
GraphDefense to improve the robustness of Graph Convolu-
tional Networks against adversarial attacks on graph structures.
We further show that adversarial training on features is equiva-
lent to adversarial training on graph structures, which could be
used as a fast method of adversarial training without losing too
much performance. Our experimental results that our defense
method successfully defense white-box graph structure attacks
for not only small datasets but also large scale datasets with
GraphSAGE [7] training. We also discuss what characteristics
of defense methods are crucial to improve the robustness.
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Fig. 9: Attack Citseer dataset with different method. Green: correctly predicted nodes; Brown incorrectly predicted nodes.
